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Robert Halsall
GDR architecture and town planning in post-unification Germany:
‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ or aesthetic autonomy?
Von meinem Übergangsburo im ehemaligen Staatsratsgebäude muß ich immer
auf den Palast der Republik gucken. Der ist so monströs, daß ich da lieber ein
Schloß hätte. [...] Den Befürwortern (des Schlosses) wird ja unterstellt, sie
wollten – weil dann der Palast der Republik wegkäme – damit gleichsam die
Geschichte der DDR eliminieren. Das steht für mich überhaupt nicht im
Vordergrund. Wenn der nicht so häßlich und voller Asbest wäre, könnte der
meinetwegen stehenbleiben.1
These comments by Gerhard Schröder about the ‘Palast der Republik’
encapsulate much of the substance of the debate about GDR architecture
in the 10 years since the ‘Wende’. Schröder's carefully chosen words
illustrate his desire to move the debate about the retention or demolition
of the ‘Palast der Republik’ away from the symbolic level of ideology,
the triumph of one system over another and the elimination of the history
of the GDR, to that of pure aesthetics: his personal architectural
preferences for a historical building rather than the modernist ‘Palast’.
His comments recognise the emotions behind the debate as far as
‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ of the GDR past is concerned, but he wishes to
distance himself from the debate. For those interested in the architecture
of the GDR, Schröder's comments could be interpreted as a welcome turn
in the debate: a move away from ideological posturing towards more
reasoned architectural debate. On the other hand, this might indicate, that,
as far as Schröder is concerned, the questions of
'Gesschichtsaufarbeitung' which have dominated debate about the
building for 10 years are now effectively over. Could this mean that any
historical reasons for preserving GDR architecture are also now past? If
we look at the debate about GDR architecture, however, it is clear that,
whilst recently the debate has become more about architecture than
ideology, the questions of ‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ are clearly not over,
even if Schröder wishes it were so.
When we speak of ‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ in relation to GDR
architecture, we are faced with the fundamental question raised by
Schröder's comments whether the architectural legacy is to be treated
primarily as an aesthetic expression of a discredited ideology and thus to
be treated in the same way as other expressions of this ideology, in
comparable fashion to the architectural expression of other totalitarian
ideologies in the 20th century. We are, of course, here faced with an
immediate and ultimately unhelpful comparison with the post-war
‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ relating to the symbols and architecture of the
Third Reich. Like the period after the Second World War, the initial
period after the end of Communism in Eastern Europe was accompanied
by the desire for a 'Bildersturm', the immediate removal of the most easily
identifiable symbols of the previous regime.2 Whilst this may have
satisfied the initial desire to remove icons of a discredited regime, it
cannot be said to constitute ‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ in any deeper sense,
in fact could be seen as a reflection of an uncritical attitiude of ‘out of
sight, out of mind’, such as might have been the case in relation to the
symbols of the Third Reich. The desire to remove all symbols of a regime
without reflection on what history lessons they can teach us is, as
Habermas has argued, just as much an inadequate guarantee of the critical
reflection on history necessary to genuine ‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’, as an
uncritical historicism, where everything from the past is preserved simply
because it is from the past. 3
If we are to address adequately the question of ‘Geschichts-
aufarbeitung’ in relation to architecture, we need in particular to address
the specific theoretical and aesthetic questions which relate to the
relationship between architecture, ideology and history. If we are to learn
history lessons from architecture, as the theorist Fredric Jameson has
argued in relation to the architectural debate in Eastern Europe since
1990, we need to address two questions: ‘the pedagogical value in the
present of urban traces of the past; and the relationship between space and
current production as such’.4
The first of these questions, the pedagogical value of the
architecture of the past, we can describe as the degree to which we can
learn history lessons, positive or negative, from the architecture of the
past. However, this is not just related to the general question of what we
can learn about values and ideologies of the past through architecture,
but also the specific architectural debates amongst architects about the
interpretation of past architectural styles. Our ability to learn history
lessons from an overtly political architecture such as that of the GDR
depends on the degree to which it is possible or desirable to separate
political intention from aesthetic result. As Jameson puts it, the question
is: ‘whether the work of art, the building as such, has any kind of intrinsic
power to enforce any kind of aesthetic response, let alone the one planned
or foreseen by its maker’(Jameson, p.72). If the answer to this question in
relation to GDR architecture is unavoidably affirmative, in other words
that there is an essential relationship between the ideological nature of the
GDR regime and its architectural products, then this will determine our
actions in wishing to remove it in wholesale fashion, as in the case of
Nazi architecture. If we answer the question in the negative, admitting a
more complex relationship between political intention and reception,
then, accordingly, we have a more complex debate about the positive and
negative aspects of the architecture of the GDR and the relationship
between the architecture and the people who live in and around it.
As we examine the debate in the former GDR over the past 10
years, we can see evidence of two distinct phases of the debate, relating
to this central question of political intention and reception. In the first
phase, the ‘Bildersturm’, which took place in the initial years after the
‘Wende’, there was an understandable simple unambiguous identification
of the regime with its most obvious architectural symbols and the
consequent desire to remove them. In the later phase, a more complex
debate has ensued, in which there has been a more distanced, critical
examination of the positive and negative features of GDR architecture,
even resulting in the desire to preserve what was formerly seen as
worthless.
Returning to Jameson’s two criteria, the second of these, the
practical question of how past architectural space relates to the present
requirements of production, has been just as important in the debate as
the more ‘ideological’ dimension. In other words, planners and architects
in the former GDR have faced the practical problems of how to adapt the
GDR architectural inheritance (even if it is accepted that it is desirable to
preserve some of it) to the needs of capitalist society. This need for
adaptation relates, for instance, to the unsuitability of GDR planned
towns and cities to the commercial and other needs of capitalist cities,
and to the loss of function for individual buildings. In many ways, as we
shall see, the ‘ideological’ debate, which has been ongoing parallel to
this, has hindered architects and planners in coming up with solutions at a
more practical level to the architectural and planning problems involved
in this.
GDR state architectural policy and the architectural legacy
Before examining each of these criteria in detail and looking at
case studies, if we are to examine the general question of the relationship
between ideology and architecture in relation to GDR architecture, we
need firstly to outline how GDR state ideology expressed itself in terms
of planning and architecture.
Perhaps the most important feature of GDR architecture, at least in
terms of the current legacy, was the attempt to create a unity between
town planning, architecture and art. As the GDR architectural historian
Bruno Flierl puts it, this was:
der Anspruch, die Stadt in der Qualität des Architektonischen und die
Architektur in der Dimension des Städtischen zu gestalten – sozial-räumlich,
praktisch und ästhetisch strukturiert nach Ensembles – als kommensurable
Teile eines Ganzen.5
This idea of ‘Ganzheitlichkeit’ had its origin, of course, in ideology,
namely, to quote Flierl once again: ‘Die Stadt in der DDR ist die sozial-
räumliche Organisation des Zusammenlebens der Menschen unter des
real-existierenden Sozialismus’(Flierl 1998, p.32). Looked at purely in
terms of intention, we might see this as just a reflection of a totalitarian
ideology. Looked at in terms of the result produced, however, we might
view it as a utopian idea which went wrong because of the rigidity with
which it was employed. In practical terms, however, the ideal of
‘Ganzheitlichkeit’ had a number of dimensions which, applied more or
less uniformly throughout the GDR, have produced the particular
problems which planners and architects now have to come to terms with.
The first of these was the attempt in the 50’s and 60’s to give town
centres a symbolic significance which would represent the triumph of the
socialist idea through the building of dominant symbols, such as the
‘Fernsehturm’ in Berlin, the university skyscrapers in Leipzig and Jena,
and hotels and other dominant buildings in other cities. Tied up with this
‘need to represent’ the state was the idea that the centrality of urban
spaces should be based on what Flierl calls ‘autoritäre Zentralität’ or
‘kommunikative Zentralität’ rather than the commercial centrality typical
of the capitalist city.6 This was reflected in the wide open squares and
gardens such as those between Marx-Engels Platz (now Schloßplatz) and
Alexnderplatz in Berlin, and the wide avenues such as the former
Stalinallee in Berlin or the Straße der Nationen in Chemnitz (former Karl-
Marx-Stadt). In addition, the fact that centrality in GDR cities was given
to non-commercial uses such as housing, together with the huge empty
spaces has, from the practical point of view, been one of the most
important dimensions of the problems faced by architects and planners in
the former GDR cities in the last 10 years. Added to this were the
numerous political statues and monuments and examples of ‘Kunst am
Bau’, which also gave expression to the state ideology. Important to note
about these, however, was that they were intended as an integral part of
ensembles. In other words, decisions about the removal or retention of
individual statues, monuments and examples of ‘Kunst am Bau’ in the
last 10 years have had to take account their importance in terms of the
architectural ensemble rather than in isolation. This fact, as we shall see
later, has led to a more differentiated ‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ in relation
to these monuments, at least in recent years.
We can, of course, trace changes in ideology in relation to
architecture and planning in the course of the 40 years of GDR history.
The ‘representative’ phase of the 50’s and 60’s, in which most city
centres and planned towns were built, was replaced by a no less
ideological phase, but one with a different emphasis, namely the slogan
‘Wohnungsbau statt Städtebau’. In this period the mass-produced
housing or ‘Plattenbauten’ was produced, both on edge of city housing
estates and housing blocks in city centres. This period was also
characterised by a move away from the wholesale demolition policies of
the 50’s and 60’s in relation to older buildings to some conservation of
the historic city fabric (e.g. the Nicolaiviertel in Berlin).
We have here, then, a sketch of the main elements of GDR
architecture and planning which had to be dealt with after 1990. Before
looking in detail at the decisions and debates which have ensued, we
might attempt to assess what the positive and negative features of the
architectural legacy (rather than the ideological intention) might be. We
might divide these into two dimensions, not exclusive of each other, the
utopian and the totalitarian. In the former we might include the social
aims of planning in the GDR, for instance, the production of low cost
housing in city centres. Against this, of course, has to be balanced that, in
practice, the ‘Plattenbauten’ produced, in their uniformity and poor
aesthetic quality, might be held to be a totalitarian distortion of a laudable
social aim.
A second utopian element might be the fact that communal
property determined the development process in cities rather than the
needs of property developers and private enterprise, enabling the
realisation of social aims. The other aspect of this, however, was that, as
we see today in former GDR cities, without the discipline of the market
and the necessary mixing and centralisation of uses, city centres have an
empty, ‘desert-like’ appearance and lack the vibrancy associated with
town centres in the West.
Finally, the utopian attempt to achieve a unity of planning,
architecture and art might be seen as a positive element of the legacy.
However, in practice, the massive scale and monumentality of the
ensembles produced often dwarfs the human being and could be seen as
an allegory of how the state dominated the individual in the GDR.
These principal ideological elements of architecture and planning
in the GDR, therefore, could be interpreted, in terms of
‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’, as either an allegory of a failed utopia or the
product of a totalitarian ideology, or both. In assessing the arguments for
and against the retention/demolition of individual monuments and
buildings and in the planning of cities, we will find this essential
ambiguity reflected in more or less all of the discourse. We can at this
point rehearse some of the principal arguments which have been put
forward:
1. The ‘unambiguous ideological expression’ argument. GDR
architecture represents an unambiguous expression of the ideology of
the regime. There is therefore no case for retaining it.
2. The ‘negative history lesson’ argument. There is a case for retaining at
least some GDR architecture as a reminder/warning of the dangers of
totalitarianism.
3. The ‘allegory of utopia’ argument. There is a case for retaining some
GDR architecture as an allegory for utopian thought which, although
people no longer believe in the ideology which produced the
architecture, still has some positive value.
4. The ‘identification of the population’ argument. There is a case for
retaining some GDR architecture because some sections of the former
GDR population identify with it as part of their lived experience,
despite their rejection of the ideology which produced it. The question
is whether this constitutes an example of the phenomenon of
‘Ostalgie’ identified by critics in relation to other aspects of life in the
former GDR.
5. The ‘normality’ or ‘aesthetic autonomy’ argument. That, with more
distance in time from the ideology which created it, it should be
possible to judge GDR buildings primarily on aesthetic merit, as is the
case with buildings in Western cities, rather than primarily as
expressions of ideology.
The first phase of the debate: the ‘Bildersturm’
The years following successful revolutions in the 20th century have
tended to be accompanied by a ‘Bildersturm’, the removal of the most
immediate images or icons of the power of the old regime which has been
replaced, such as public statues, monuments and insignias. This way of
coming to terms with the misdeeds of the hated regime has been a feature
not just of post-war Germany’s response to the Nazi era in East and West,
but also the GDR’s own treatment of its ‘imperialist’ past in terms of the
demolition of key symbolic buildings such as the ‘Stadtschloß’ in Berlin.
In the case of the socialist monuments of Eastern Europe, however,
and in the GDR in particular, the initial understandable emotive response
has been tempered in the passing of time with a more complex and
differentiated debate about precisely which monuments should be
destroyed and which retained.7 This debate, as did the debate about street
renaming, generated widely divergent responses on the degree to which
figures after whom monuments had been erected or streets named, were
tainted by association with the regime or whether they had any lasting
historical significance notwithstanding this.
In Berlin the Senate set up a ‘Kommission zum Umgang mit den
politischen Denkmälern der Nachkriegszeit im ehemaligen Ost-Berlin’ to
discuss the issues raised by controversial cases such as the Lenin
Monument or Ernst Thälmann Monument. The Commission concentrated
on three factors in coming to a decision on individual monuments: firstly,
the nature of the figures/events commemorated by the monuments and
whether they were necessarily associated with the regime and had no
historical significance outside this; secondly, the nature of the monument
itself, its style and setting, in other words its artistic merit; thirdly, its
historical significance as a testament of history.
The first factor necessitated a debate about the significance of
figures in GDR history which was ongoing in the general process of
‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ and was paralleled in the debate on street
renaming. However the second factor, the stylistic debate about
individual monuments, was a factor specific to the debate about
architecture. As regards monuments such as the Lenin and Ernst
Thälmann monuments in Berlin, it was not just the figures themselves,
but the nature of their depiction which were thought unacceptable as far
as retention were concerned: the bombastic and authoritarian gesture of
the statues was thought an unacceptable reminder of the triumphalist and
authoritarian nature of the state which built them. Other monuments, on
the other hand, such as the statues of Marx and Engels on the Marx-
Engels Forum, were thought less obtrusive and authoritarian, and were
even looked on with affection by the East Berlin population, and thus
were thought worthy of preservation.
The debate surrounding the third dimension considered by the
Commission, the wider historical significance of monuments, was
characterised by a fundamental ambiguity in relation to public works of
art. Whilst it is possible to debate the historical significance of the figure
represented in a monument or the artistic merit of the statue in isolation,
the historical significance of a public work of art in a time of historical
change such as this is marked by a fundamental ambiguity which has
been described by Mark Lewis in the following terms:
Like the fetish, the public work of art serves (at least) two ends, […].The
monument covers up crimes against the public in so far as it is able to
temporarily ‘smother’ the possibility of remembering specific histories in
terms of the violence that engendered them; it instead commemorates a history
or event in terms of a pernicious heroism or nationalism. But at the same time,
the monument exists as a perpetual marker, a reminder of those very crimes.
[…] And when the symbolic order is thrown into crisis […] the public
monument’s semantic charge shifts and the work […] begins to take on the
characteristics of a scar – literally a permanent monument to the original
crime(s). This may be as good a reason as any for the retention of at least
some works.8
Ironically, then, even the more bombastic, authoritarian monuments from
the GDR might, it could be argued, act as a negative history lesson,
testifying to the crimes which those who built them or whom they
commemorate committed, contrary to the intentions implicit behind the
monument. If all the offending monuments are removed, according to this
argument, there is nothing left from which we can learn negative history
lessons, and thus this can perhaps lead to the erasure of the negative
associations of history from the public memory. It is difficult to locate the
precise point in history afer the ‘Wende’ where, in Lewis's terms, the
‘semantic charge’ of such monuments shifted sufficiently to allow the
‘negative history lesson’ argument to emerge. It is true to say, however,
that the necessary distance required for such a symbolic re-orientation is
rarely present in the immediate aftermath of a change of regime and was
not in the early years after the end of the GDR.
As the debate progressed, it became apparent that not just factors
relating to the interpretation of history had to be taken into account, but
the importance of the monuments and ensembles of which they formed a
part to the local populations to whom they were part of their urban
identity. In other words, the associations of people living in the spaces
which surrounded these monuments were not necessarily those associated
with the political intentions of the monument. The recognition of the
urban context of monuments, particularly important, as I have argued, in
terms of GDR architecture, led to a move beyond the phase of the debate
in which the simplistic formula ‘removal = forgetting, retention =
remembering’ was the motto.
The importance of context has been stressed by Hans-Ernst Mittig
in his examination of the removal of GDR monuments in East Berlin in
the period 1990-95. He divides these cases into three categories:
1. Where the monument has been removed and its site has been made
unrecognisbable from its state during the GDR.
2. The monument has been removed, but the space it inhabited remains
redolent with associations of the GDR.
3. The monument has been removed and a previous (i.e. before the
GDR) form of the space has been reconstructed, thus obliterating any
association with the GDR.9
An example of the importance of the urban context was provided in the
case of the Lenin monument in the district of Friedrichshain in East
Berlin. After heated discussion the decision was taken by the
Commission to remove the statue in 1992. After the removal of the statue,
the pedestal which it formerly occupied remained in an empty square for
some two years. During the period various graffiti and even the painting
of a silhouette of the statue on the ground indicated that, although the
statue had been removed, the memory of it as something giving context to
the urban space remained amongst residents. Given the emptiness of the
square, some residents obviously wished that the statue was still there.
This should not necessarily be taken as an expression of identification
with the figure of Lenin himself. The pedestal was then removed and two
years later, in connection with the renaming of the square as ‘Platz der
Vereinten Nationen’, a fountain was erected from blocks of stone from
around the world.
This case clearly represents a move from Mittig’s category 2 to
category 1: not only has the monument been removed, but the space has
been transformed so that it no longer has any associations with the GDR.
We can perhaps interpret this as a political counter-gesture to eradicate
any memory of the former political significance of the place, but what is
clear from this and other examples is that ‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ in
relation to such political monuments is not simply a question of removing
or preserving monuments, but the transformation or otherwise of the
whole context in which they existed and the identification of the
population with their lived experience of the past, although not
necessarily the political intentions behind it.
The second phase of the debate: the move to ‘aesthetic autonomy’
The raising of the question of the identification of the former GDR
population or at least sections of it with particular buildings or spaces
either removed or under the threat of removal indicates a new phase of
the debate, where ‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ is more complex and
controversial, but more ‘normal’ than in the ‘Bildersturm’ phase in the
sense that this has seen the attempt to apply ‘normal’ aesthetic and
historical criteria associated with urban conservation in other parts of
Germany to these decisions, albeit no less controversially.
An example of the entrance of the ‘normality’ or ‘aesthetic
autonomy’ argument into the debate and the controversy evoked by it was
the decision of the state of Saxony in 1994 to issue a preservation order
for the Karl Marx monument in Chemnitz and the complex of buildings
associated with it, the Karl-Marx-Forum. In the justification for the
preservation order, the following reasons were cited:
Das öffentliche Erhaltungsinteresse gründet sich auf die hier zutreffende
Bedeutung für die Deutung einer Epoche der jüngeren Geschichte Sachsens
und Deutschlands insofern, als an keiner Stelle Sachsens so anschaulich wird,
was der Alleinvertretungsanspruch des Marxismus-Leninismus als
Philosophie- und Gesellschaftsmodell darstellte, wie eine geschlossene
Gesellschaft und ein zentralistisch ausgerichteter Staat sich verstanden. Der
geradezu sakralen Erhöhung eines der Begründer dieses Gesellschaftmodells
Karl Marx, kommt darüber hinaus Singularität zu.10
Apart from this overall justification, relying heavily on the ‘negative
history lesson’ argument, the following factors, relying heavily on the
‘aesthetic autonomy’ argument, were considered equally important:
1. The ensemble of buildings around the Karl Marx monument is all-
important in the preservation decision. One element of this ensemble
(i.e. the statue) could not be removed without destroying the
architectural qualities of the whole.
2. This is a typical example of 60’s architecture in Europe as a whole.
Apart from the obvious ideological associations as testified by the
statue and inscriptions on the building behind it, it can be compared
with similar 60’s developments in Rotterdam or in West German
cities. So far as 60’s architecture is deemed worthy of preservation,
therefore, the Karl-Marx-Forum is worthy of preservation as an
example of this architectural style.
We see here the emergence of a ‘normality’ or ‘aesthetic autonomy’
argument: the belief that it is possible and desirable to assess the
architectural merits of a GDR building or ensemble on its own merits as
an example of an architectural style and not just as an expression of
ideology.
This invocation of ‘normality’ in relation to architectural decisions,
however, did not mean that this decision and others like it did not
provoke an emotional response from the media and the public. The
Chemnitzer Morgenpost, for instance, called the proposal to designate the
area a conservation area equivalent to the idea ‘Teile der Chemnitzer
Plattenbau-City zum DDR-Freiluft-Museum zu machen’!11 The
emotional response, however much influenced by the media is perhaps
understandable as, for some people, declaring these buildings, including
the former offices of the SED ‘Bezirksleitung’ as worthy of conservation
as any ‘normal’ building might be considered equivalent to saying that
we should forget about the crimes of the Stasi.
The emphasis in these decisions on architectural context, the
permanence of the lived environment and the ambiguities of the
identification of the population with it, however, demonstrate that the
debate in relation to buildings cannot be conducted in the same way as
that as regards people or institutions, because of the nature of architecture
as such.
The trend, in the years which followed, away from the relatively
simplistic debate of the ‘Bildersturm’ period towards a more
differentiated view culminated in a statement by the ‘Deutsche
Nationalkomittee für Denkmalschutz’ in November 1995:
Die abgeschlossene Bauepoche der DDR ist Teil der jüngeren deutschen
Architektur – und Baugeschichte. […] In der Betrachtung und Bewertung
‘historischer Bausubstanz’ dieser Bauepoche kommen Betroffene und
Fachleute begreiflicherweise zu unterschiedlichen, oft kontroversen
Ergebnissen. Um so mehr ist es erforderlich, sich […] Zeit zu nehmen und
eine sachbezogenere Forschung zu den treffenden Entscheidungen
voranzustellen.[…] Auch die Notwendigkeit, in zeitlicher Nähe zum
Gegenstand bewerten zu müssen, darf nicht dazu führen, die bewährten
Ergebnisse der Denkmalwürdigkeit presizugeben.12
In this recommendation that there should be a presumption in favour of
preserving notable examples of GDR architecture and a call for a more
distanced, expert and less emotive debate, we can clearly see the
increasing influence of the ‘normality’ or ‘aesthetic autonomy’ argument.
The further we get from the actual historical events, the more it should be
possible to use ‘normal’ but not necessarily ahistorical criteria in our
assessments of buildings.
A move to a more normal and distanced view has also been
reflected in the appearance of historical studies of GDR architecture,
which have not only documented the surprising variety of styles, but also
by documenting the social and cultural functions of buildings in the GDR
as well as their political intentions, have contributed to a more reasoned
and distanced debate. Examples of this are Ulrich Hartung's study of the
‘Kulturhäuser’ of the 1950's.13 These buildings, constructed in a variety
of styles from classical to modernist, illustrate the fact that the idea of a
uniform ‘GDR style’ which corresponds simply to a political ideology
masks the diversity which actually existed. Hartung's book also shows
how the utopian ideas of social and cultural use behind the building of the
‘Kulturhäuser’ have increasingly come back into favour in the context of
the commercialisation and lack of cultural facilities which now
characterise the post-unification period in east German cities:
Das wachsende Interesse an den Kulturhäusern liegt sicherlich nicht nur in
dem Wunsch gegründet, eine (un)gewisse ostdeutsche Identität zu bewahren.
Viele der Bauten gefallen wegen ihrer altmodisch-repräsentativen
Erscheinung, die postmodernen Geschmacksvorstellungen wie der Vorliebe
für Barock und Neoklassizismus entspricht. Einige Politiker beginnen diese
monumentalen Altlasten als Oasen in einer neugeschaffenen Kulturwüste
wahrzunehmen. (Hartung, p.12)
A new ‘normality’?: two contrasting examples in Berlin
If there has been a call for more ‘normality’ in the debate in recent
years, however, the degree to which this has been carried through into
practice has depended on the nature and the symbolic importance of the
individual cases, as we can see if we examine two contrasting examples
in Berlin. If we are to look for a ‘new normality’ in the debate about GDR
architecture, in many ways Berlin is not a typical example. Since the
designation of Berlin as the capital and the accompanying government
and commercial developments, the GDR debate has become caught up in
a wider debate about how to represent the new ‘Berliner Republik’ in
architectural terms, and an architectural debate about which architectural
style(s) are considered appropriate to the development of the image of
Berlin as capital.14 This wider debate, although not specifically related to
GDR architecture, has been superimposed upon the
‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ debate, perhaps throwing the issues into sharper
relief. We can illustrate this by looking at two contrasting examples, the
former ‘Stalinallee’ housing development in East Berlin, and the ‘Palast
der Republik’.
The first phase of the ‘Stalinallee’ development, east of
Strausberger Platz, has been seen as a putting into practice of state
architectural and planning ideology of the 1950's, in particular the
‘Grundsätze des Städtebaus’ of 1951.15 Behind the ideological posturing
and distancing from the West which formed the background to the
development's planning, however, the architecture actually produced by
the architects produced in the attempt to fulfil the state dictate to create a
‘national style’ for the GDR contained an eclectic mix of styles which we
would call, in today's architectural parlance, ‘postmodern’ quotations of
other styles. The first phase of ‘Stalinallee’, therefore, although produced
at the height of Stalinist influence on architecture, is interesting
historically precisely because of its non-uniform mix of styles:
der kritischer Betrachter (kommt) bald zu der Feststellung, daß hier
Zeitströmungen der Romantik, des Historismus und in dessen Gefolge der
Eklektizismus sichtbar werden. [...] Das ist, seitdem wir durch die Erfahrung
der Postmoderne in unseren Wertvorstellungen entkrampfter sind, eo ipso kein
Negativum oder Zeichen einer nichtschöpferischen Architektur. (Peters, p. 30)
The second phase of the development, west of Strausbergerplatz towards
Alexanderplatz, planned in 1958 and built during the 60's, in contrast,
marked a turn towards the functional, standardised building chracteristic
of the GDR in the 60's and 70's and is of much less architectural interest
than the first phase.16
The importance of the ‘Stalinallee’ development and the need to
preserve it have not been in dispute since reunification, perhaps not
primarily because of the fact that it is a unique historical testament to an
ideolgy, but more because the architectural style, particularly the first
phase, is interesting in itself and is acceptable to current tastes. The
symbolic dimension, i.e. the ideological intentions behind its planning,
has hardly been the most important aspect in the debate, but, rather,
practical problems such as the crumbling facades (mainly built from post-
war building rubble), and the need to adapt both internal and external
structures to modern requirements.17
However, historical factors, with their necessary ambiguity, have
not been totally left out of the debate. In fact it is the symbolic dimension
which makes out the case for the importance of the development over and
above other housing developments in East Berlin:
Unzweifelhaft bleibt der Wert dieser großen innerstädtischen Achse als
städtebauliches Denkmal und ein Zeichen sozial-utopischen Denkens, ja sogar
Versuchs. Der gelang indes nur unter der rigiden Enteignung von privatem
Besitz, Voraussetzungen, welche die Demokratie nicht fordert und kennt. In
diesem Sinne bleibt die Absolutheit dieser Straße ein Stück Geschichte nicht
allein Berlins.18
In this historical assessment we can once again see here instances of both
the ‘allegory of utopia’ and the ‘negative history lesson’ arguments
expressed simultaneously. Only because of the fact that the development
is being preserved and renovated, however, primarily for architectural
reasons, to restore it to a state as close as possible to its original
condition, can we learn history lessons from it, whether positive or
negative.
We can contrast this relatively uncontroversial debate about
‘Stalinallee’ with one which has been much more controversial, that
relating to the ‘Palast der Republik’. To summarise this debate, still
ongoing, and the huge quantity written and said about it, would go
beyond what is possible in this paper. However, we can outline the main
phases of the debate. The building has been closed since 1990 because of
the presence of asbestos in its structure. The building itself, and the
Schloßplatz (formerly Marx-Engels-Platz) on which it is situated, are
owned by the Federal Government. By virtue of this fact alone, together
with the designation of Berlin as the capital and the accompanying
relocation of government buildings, has meant that the debate about the
building has taken on a symbolic importance well beyond that associated
with any other former GDR building. In fact it could be said that the fate
of this building has, for some people, come to represent the fate of the
former GDR itself.
In the early years following re-unification, a clear decision was
taken to demolish the building, principally on the grounds of the asbestos
and the technical and financial impossibility of removing it (if the
original decision had been implemented the building would have been
demolished in 1994). This decision to remove the building was confirmed
by the winning design in the architectural competition held for the
Spreeinsel in 1993 by Bernd Niebuhr, which envisaged the construction
of a building similar in design and proportions to the original
‘Stadtschloß’ which occupied the site until its demolition by the GDR in
the 50’s.
The proposal to rebuild the Stadtschloß as an alternative to the
retention of the Palast meant that the debate about the future of the
building moved onto a new plane: the debate was now about which past
was deemed appropriate to represent the new Berlin.19 A further
complicating factor in the debate was the decision of the Federal
Government in 1994 to reduce the original cost of the move from Bonn to
Berlin by using existing buildings rather than constructing new buildings
for government offices. This obviated the need for Schloßplatz to be used
as a ‘representative’ site for a new government building. With this
decision the arguments for a more ‘Berlin-specific’ rather than a state use
of the site increased. The current situation as regards the building is that,
although the decision to remove the Palast remains in principle, asbestos
is currently being removed from the structure, a process which will be
completed at the end of this year. At that point a decision will be made
about the future of the building.
This obvious indecision about the future of the building is tied up
with its symbolic importance in terms of ‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ in
relation to the GDR. This is largely because the building has, at least in
the initial phases of the debate, been seen mainly in terms of its political
intention – as a ‘representative’ building of the GDR state. The debate
about its removal or retention, therefore, was seen largely in terms of
demolition as a ‘symbolic act of revenge’ upon the state which built it,
and whatever was erected in its place as the symbol of the triumph of one
system over another.20 This was, of course, further reinforced by the
proposal to rebuild the ‘Stadtschloß’ as an alternative to the Palast. This
would, when argued purely at the symbolic level, not just involve a
symbolic act of revenge or triumph, but imply a rejection of the post-war
era in Berlin per se and a return to a former era.
This ‘meta’ level of debate at the level of ideological symbolism,
however, was not the level at which most East Berliners saw the question.
For them the more important debate was about to whom the centre of
Berlin, of which the Palast for them represented the symbolic heart,
belonged: the state or the people? As Bruno Flierl puts it:
Viele Ostberliner verstehen dies (the proposal to replace the Palast with a state
building representing a unified Germany) […] als Machtwechsel am tradierten
Ort der Macht und keineswegs als einheitsstiftendes Werk für die Politik
Deutschlands und seiner Hauptstadt in Zukunft. Sie haben an diesem Ort
schon genug vom Staat und von Staatsspielen, sie wünschen sich dort […]:
Stadt statt Staat.21
Ironically, the fact that, for many East Berliners, the Palast was not
regarded primarily as a ‘representative’ symbol of the state which created
it, but rather as a central point of cultural communication, a meeting
point, and thus as something with a positive identification, was now
emphasised by those who campaigned for the retention of the building:
Der ‘Palast der Republik’ ist kein sozialistisches Schloß als
Herrschaftsgebäude geworden, sondern fungierte, solange er noch nicht
geschlossen war, als ein großes, für jedermann geöffnetes Volkshaus und
Kongreßgebäude. […] Statt eines abgeschlossenen Regierungshochhauses
entstand ein offenes Haus für kulturelle Kommunikation.22
The fact that the communal, social function of the building has been
emphasised by those East Berliners campaigning for its retention rather
than its totalitarian associations, has been criticized by some in the West
as evidence of a selective dealing with the past or ‘Ostalgie’ on the part of
former GDR citizens. If this positive identification with a building is an
example of ‘Ostalgie’, however, surely this is the expression of a
preference for a certain type of use – the social and communal – over the
commercial and state representative uses which have predominated in the
development of Berlin since 1990, rather than a preference for the
ideological system with which the building was associated. This is surely
an example of the phenomenon which Lothar Fritze, in his analysis of the
phenomenon of ‘Ostalgie’ has called ‘Partial-Nostalgie’, a feeling which:
bezieht sich gerade nicht schlechthin auf die DDR, sondern auf bestimmte
Lebensbedingungen, die zur Wirklichkeit in der DDR gehörten. […] Faktisch
handelt es sich um eine ‘Partial-Nostalgie’ auf der Basis eines kritischen
Vergleichs zwischen den früheren und den heutigen Lebensverhältnissen.23
As Fritze has pointed out, the phenomenon is by no means as irrational as
it has been portrayed. The fact that the genuinely-felt ‘feeling of loss’ in
the East as regards the social and communal orientation of the centre of
Berlin finds its symbolic projection on to the Palast is falsely interpreted
by some in the West as identification with the system which produced it.
The ‘Architektenstreit’ in Berlin
In the case of the ‘Palast der Republik’, because of its key position
and central importance, we can see more clearly than in any other case
the ambiguity of interpretation of symbols of political architecture as
regards intention and reception we have noted in the debate about GDR
architecture. The debate, particularly as it became associated with the
proposal to rebuild the Stadtschloß, has become not just a debate about
one building and its symbolic importance, but part of a wider
architectural debate in Berlin about which historical style(s) are deemed
worthy of representing the ‘New Berlin’ as capital. This
‘Architektenstreit’ has been arguably similar in form to the
‘Historikerstreit’ in that it had at its core an appeal for a return to
‘normality’ or 'Einfachheit' in planning and architecture in Berlin and an
implicit rejection of the experimentation and Modernism of the post-war
period in East and West. The debate was initiated by an article written by
Vittorio Lampugnani, the Director of the German Architectural Museum,
calling for an end to the experimentation and utopian visions which had
dominated post-war planning and architecture in East and West Berlin
since the war and a turn (or return) to a ‘Neue Einfachheit’ of domesticity
and a ‘Prussian style’, thus reconnecting with Berlin traditions of the
past.24 Lampugnani criticizes the ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ of 1950's
and 60's architecture in East and West for its belief that what he calls the
'Mythos der Innovation', the ideological commitment to modernism and
utopian thought in planning was the only way of coming to the past. The
ensuing debate about architectural style became polarised into one
between left and right, in that Lampugnani and others of a similar
architectural conviction were accused by some of constituting a ‘New
Right’ with architectural intentions similar to the Nazis.25
Although this debate has not concerned itself with GDR
architecture specifically, the fact that buildings such as the ‘Palast der
Republik’ are prime representatives of the utopian modernism which
Lampugnani and others have attacked, means that the debate about their
retention will not be restricted to the question whether the Palast is an
architecturally appropriate building for the site given its setting amongst
predominantly classical buildings, but seemingly inevitably will be bound
up with a wider historical and political debate about the interpretation of
Berlin’s architectural past.
The call for a ‘Neue Einfachheit’ and the debate about whether
Berlin can or should construct for itself a new ‘normal’ identity based on
reconnecting with the pre-war past seems to some to imply the denial of
the architectural inheritance of the post-war division. This attempt to
redefine ‘normality’ in terms of one architectural past and the implied
rejection of others has been criticized by one of the leading ‘postmodern’
architects practising in Berlin, Daniel Libeskind:
Kaum war die Mauer gefallen, da trat auch schon die Tendenz zur Nostalgie
zum Vorschein. […] Und […] die Leute (geben) die Vorstellung auf, daß
Berlin eine einzigartige Stadt ist […] nicht, weil es eine Hauptstadt ist oder
ihres ökonomischen Status wegen, sondern aufgrund ihrer Geschichte, die die
Stadt unverwechselbar macht. Berlin hat kein normales Zentrum […]. Deshalb
ist es ein Fehler, eine Hierarchie der Vergangenheit wiederherstellen zu
wollen.26
The ‘hierarchy of pasts’ which Libeskind criticizes is one in which the
GDR and its architecture would be held to be ‘abnormal’ and thus not
worthy of preservation. Libeskind advocates the recognition of the
validity of all the pasts which exist in Berlin, including the GDR. In
relation to Alexanderplatz, for instance, a typical example of GDR
architecture, for instance, whilst recognising its deficiencies, he states:
(It) is lived experience. It is not an abstraction, it is not something you that you
can change by renaming it. […] It does not matter whether you have the GDR
or not, you have that space. You can call it no longer the GDR […]. But this
does not change the nature of that space or its experience […]. No-one can
afford to ideologically just wipe it out of their minds and say, we don’t like it,
we like the old streets of medieval Berlin, because this is just wishful
thinking.27
The ‘Architektenstreit’ in Berlin, then, has demonstrated that the
arguments about GDR architecture has been overlain with a wider debate
about the identity of the city and the degree to which the GDR past is
included within this.
‘Normality’ and city planning: Berlin and Chemnitz
The debate about GDR architecture has not just been confined to
individual buildings and developments, but to the planning of city centres
as a whole, as can be seen in relation to debate about the ‘Planwerk
Innenstadt’, the master plan for Berlin produced by the Berlin Senate in
February 1997. The main professed aim of the plan was to create an
identity for the city centre which would overcome the legacy of two
centres produced by the wall and division of the city. The problem
involved in this, however, is stated clearly by Senator Peter Strieder in the
introduction to the document:
Es gibt aber nicht nut keinen Konsens darüber, wo sich dieses Zentrum
befindet, […] sondern es läufen auch die Meinungen darüber auseinander, was
ein Zentrum der Bundeshauptstadt sei, was hier stattfinden und vor allem, wie
es auszusehen habe.28
The key point of the plan is that, in order to develop a true centre with
which all Berliners and, as the new capital, all Germans can identify, the
‘historische Mitte’, in other words what constituted the focal point of the
former ‘Hauptstadt der DDR’, cannot remain just a point of identification
for East Berliners and thus must undergo fundamental changes. As
Staatssekretär Hans Stimmann says in the plan:
Die Mitte ist in Zukunft nicht nur Zentrum einer 3,5 Millionen-Einwohner-
Stadt, sondern ebenso ein räumlicher, funktionaler und emotionaler
Bezugspunkt der Bundesrepublik. Das jetzige Bild kann man zwar als
Ergebnis sozialistischer Planungsgeschichte erklären, die Erwartung an die
Gestalt des Historischen Zentrums erfüllt man allerdings nicht (Planwerk, 20).
The plan did not aim to achieve this by means of creating a ‘tabula rasa’
by the wholesale demolition of GDR buildings, but by seeking to connect
the present city to the past, basing future planning as far as possible on
the original street pattern of the historical city and the remnants of the
former city wall (not the Berlin wall). As the plan states in justification of
this: ‘die Erinnerung an eine historische Stadt (ist) ausgelöscht worden
[…]. Es ist, als hätte hier vor 1960 niemand gelebt’ (Planwerk, 49).
As well as trying to create a common identity by reconnecting with
the past, the plan also attempts to come to terms with the fact that the
City-Ost cannot function as a functioning city centre for all Berlin
because of the legacy of GDR planning – the wide open spaces and lack
of commercial uses prevent this: ‘eine City kann sich nur dort bilden, wo
eine Vedichtung von Geld, Kultur, Mode und städtischem Raum möglich
ist’ (Planwerk, 51). From this need stemmed one of the main principles of
the plan, ‘Verdichtung’ or filling out of the spaces between buildings, and
the mixing of city functions typical of a ‘normal’ city centre.
The plan has generated controversy since its formulation, in
particular the lack of acceptance of its main principle by many East
Berliners, that the City-Ost must adapt and change in order to function as
a centre for the whole of Berlin. The debate about the plan has focused,
firstly, on the question ‘whose city’ the centre is, in particular the area
between Schloßplatz and Alexanderplatz. Many East Berliners identify
strongly with this area as ‘their’ city centre and rejected the planned
‘Verdichtung’ and introduction of commercial uses put forward in the
plan. As a result, the Senate has had to scale down its plans for the
development, for instance, allowing Marx-Engels-Forum to remain
primarily a green space between Rathaus and Fernsehturm. Secondly,
residents of the ‘Plattenbauten’ housing blocks around the Alexanderplatz
do not accept that their area should not continue primarily as a residential
area for them rather than part of the new city centre, nor that there is a
need to introduce a mix of different social groups into the area as
proposed by the Senate.
We can conclude that the situation in Berlin, perhaps because of its
enhanced significance as the capital and the ensuing ‘Architektenstreit’, is
far from being ‘normal’ if this this means uncontroversial, and the
debates there rage on. If we are to look for a more typical example of
successful ‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ in relation to GDR architecture and
planning, we can perhaps turn to a city outside Berlin, Chemnitz. The
very fact that the city was so comprehensively planned as a GDR model
city and the concomitant fact that it is simply impossible to go back to a
past before this, has meant that planners and architects have had to accept
the GDR legacy as a fact and deal with it on a more pragmatic and
practical, but not ahistorical basis. The principal problem which faced
planners was that the centre, a huge area between Rathaus, Stadthalle and
Congress-Hotel was, to all intents, empty, and that, as a consequence, the
city had no central area to attract investors and thus to compete with other
cities in Saxony. However, the unalterable fact of its outward appearance
has meant that planners and architects have continued to build in the
modernist tradition, not trying to change the identity of the city, but
improving it in terms of a pragmatic ‘Stadtreperatur’, encouraging new
buildings of a high standard in a modernist style.29 To this end, Chemnitz
attempts to portray itself as a city of modernity and innovation, accepting
its GDR past as part of this.
Conclusion
If we are seeing a new phase of ‘normality’ in relation to the debate
about GDR architecture 10 years after the Wende, it is no means the case
that questions of ideology, history and ‘Geschichtsaufarbeitung’ have all
been solved or left behind. However the distance in time from the events
of 10 years ago may enable those involved in decisions to take more
account of the complexity and ambiguity of the relationship between
architecture, symbolism and the identification of people with the built
environment than was the case in the early years after reunification.
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